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Abstract. Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to 
certain aims. Hedonistic versions of ethical consequentialism spell out what is morally 
right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic 
versions of epistemic consequentialism spell out what is epistemically right/justified via 
recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false 
ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also 
interesting disanalogies. For example, popular versions of epistemic consequentialism implicitly 
endorse the truth-indication principle (which claims that a belief is epistemically justified only 
if there are factors indicating that the belief itself is true), whereas popular versions of ethical 
consequentialism do not subscribe to an analogous pleasure-indicating principle (which claims 
that an act is morally justified only if there are factors indicating that performing the act itself is 
pleasurable). In a first step I will argue that this difference rests on the fact that plausible 
versions of epistemic consequentialism have to meet certain constraints, which versions of 
ethical consequentilialism do not have to satisfy. As these constraints can be easily met by 
incorporating the truth-indication principle, epistemic consequentialists tend to subscribe to it. 
In a second step I will investigate whether the identified constraints can also be met 
independently of the truth-indication principle. Are there plausible versions of veritistic 
epistemic consequentialism that reject the principle, thereby allowing that some beliefs can be 
epistemically justified even though no factors speak in favor of their truth? Building on ideas 
put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright, and others, I will answer this question 
affirmatively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The terms “justification” and “rationality” refer to many different relations and 
phenomena. Many epistemologists agree that the best way to specify epistemic 
justification/rationality and thereby differentiate it from other forms of 
justification/rationality is the following: Epistemic justification/rationality, unlike moral 
or pragmatic justification/rationality, is directed at an epistemic aim, whereas other 
forms of justification/rationality are directed at other aims. Thereby, many 
epistemologists adopt a consequentialist position in the sense that they spell out the 
normative notions of “justification” or “rationality” by recourse to certain epistemic 
aims.1  
The main motivation for adopting such a consequentialist position in 
epistemology is its explanatory strength. Consider the following case:  
 
Criminal child. The child of person S is accused of a terrible crime based on 
very good evidence. Even though S knows about all the evidence and can neither 
undermine nor override it in any way, S nonetheless holds onto the belief that 
the child is innocent.  
 
From a pretheoretical perspective, it seems plausible that S’s belief can be 
justified/rational in a certain sense, whereas in another sense the belief seems clearly 
unjustified/irrational. This can be easily explained within the above-mentioned 
epistemic consequentialist framework: S’s belief might be pragmatically justified 
because entertaining the belief that one’s child is innocent might be conducive to a 
person’s practical aim; maybe the person aims at living a happy life and would not be 
able to achieve that aim if she gave up the belief. However, S’s belief is obviously not 
epistemically justified/rational because entertaining the belief that the child is innocent 
does not seem to be conducive to an epistemic aim, for example the aim of increasing 
the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. In the light of cases 
such as this, many epistemologists take truth-conduciveness to be a defining feature of 
                                                
1 One might claim that the given characteriziation only specifies what we might call a “teleological” and 
not necessarily a consequentialist position. However, in the context of this paper I will not differentiate 
between the two. I will use the term “consequentialism” to refer to all positions that spell out normative 
notions via recourse to the aim of achieving something of final value. 
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epistemic justification/rationality and thereby adopt an epistemic consequentialist 
position. 
Even though the whole epistemic consequentialist framework has been recently 
attacked by Selim Berker (2013a, 2013b), I will accept the general framework in what 
follows. Berker’s considerations do not seem to constitute devastating objections to the 
general framework, and the necessity of explaining the differences among various forms 
of justification/rationality gives us very good reason to adopt such a framework.2  
Moreover, even though I agree that different important epistemic values have to 
be distinguished, for the purpose of this paper, I accept that one very important 
epistemic value is truth, and one very important epistemic disvalue is falsity.3 Thus, I 
will accept that increasing the number of true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs can be 
considered an important epistemic goal by recourse to which some important epistemic 
notions can be specified. (I will mostly concentrate on the notion of epistemic 
justification.) Hence, I will accept a veritistic consequentialist framework.  
What I am interested in is the question of how such a framework should be 
spelled out in more detail. What are the constraints for a convincing veritistic 
consequentialist position? In what way can these constraints be met? To answer these 
questions, it is helpful first to consider the putative analogy between epistemic and 
ethical consequentialism. Even though epistemic and ethical variants of 
consequentialism are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also important 
disanalogies. Some of these disanalogies will eventually help to identify constraints that 
epistemic versions of consequentialism have to meet. Identifying these constraints will 
in turn allow consideration of different ways in which the constraints might be satisfied. 
In following this general strategy, the paper is organized as follows: 
In section 2, I will first specify structural analogies between epistemic and 
ethical variants of consequentialism. After highlighting the analogies, I will, in section 
3, identify an important disanalogy with respect to these positions. In this context, I will 
introduce the following “truth-indication principle” (henceforth (TI)). 
 
                                                
2 I will hint at some reasons why Berker’s objections do not seriously undermine the epistemic 
consequentialist framework below (see fn. 22). It should also be noted that Berker does not take the 
reasons that speak in favor of such a framework seriously into account.  
3 For interesting discussions of various epistemic values, see, e.g., Haddock et. al 2009; Grimm 2008; 
Kvanvig 2005.   
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(TI) For all subjects S and propositions p: S’s belief that p is epistemically 
justified only if there are factors indicating that the belief itself is true. 
 
Even though this principle is rarely explicitly mentioned, I will argue that popular 
consequentialist positions in epistemology (internalist and externalist versions alike) 
implicitly endorse (TI). However, no analogue principle (for example, a pleasure-
indication principle) can be found within ethical consequentialist positions. Thus, from 
a certain perspective, an important difference between epistemic and ethical 
consequentialism amounts to the fact that epistemic versions of consequentialism seem 
to be committed to (TI), whereas no analogous principle is warranted in the ethical 
domain. The reason epistemic consequentialists tend to incorporate (TI) into their 
framework is that, by incorporating (TI), they can meet certain constraints that every 
plausible version of epistemic consequentialism has to satisfy. In the course of section 
3, I will identify these constraints in detail. 
 In section 4, I will consider whether the identified constraints can only be met by 
accepting (TI) or also be met differently. In other words: Are there plausible versions of 
epistemic consequentialism that reject the truth-indication principle (TI)? If there were, 
then the analogy between epistemic and ethical consequentialism would, in a certain 
sense, be even stronger than it seems at first. By specifying and modifying some ideas 
famously introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969) and further developed by Crispin 
Wright (2004, 2014) and others, I will spell out a promising epistemic consequentialist 
position that meets the identified constraints but is nevertheless not committed to (TI). 
 
 
2. The analogy between ethical and epistemic consequentialism 
 
Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by making 
recourse to the goal of achieving states of affairs that have final value.  A state of affairs 
has final value if and only if it has value as end in itself (in contrast to having 
instrumental value as a means to some other valuable end). To keep things simple in 
terms of theories of value, I will concentrate on a simple version of hedonism in ethics, 
which claims that experiencing pleasure has final value and experiencing pain has final 
disvalue, and a simple version of veritism in epistemology, which claims that having 
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true beliefs has final epistemic value and having false beliefs has final epistemic 
disvalue. 4   
By accepting these final values, consequentialists in ethics and epistemology can 
formulate important aims, namely the aims of achieving the states of affairs of final 
value in their respective domains. In what follows, I will call these aims “ultimate 
aims”. For hedonistic consequentialists, the ultimate aim in the ethical domain consists 
in improving the overall balance of pleasurable versus painful experiences (by 
increasing the number of pleasurable experiences and decreasing the number of painful 
ones). For veritistic consequentialists, the ultimate aim in the epistemic domain consists 
in improving the overall balance of (interesting) true beliefs over false ones (by 
inreasing the number of true and decreasing the number of false beliefs).5 6 
By making recourse to these aims, those taking consequentialist positions in 
ethics and epistemology can put forward normative evaluations. For example, by 
referring to the specified aims, hedonistic consequentialists in ethics can evaluate acts 
as being morally justified, and veritistic consequentialists in epistemology can evaluate 
beliefs as being epistemically justified: 
 
(MJ) Moral Justification of Acts. For all subjects S and acts A: S’s action A is 
morally justified only if performing A is conducive to the ultimate aim of 
improving the overall balance of pleasurable experiences over painful 
experiences (to a certain degree).7 
                                                
4 Note that according to this characterization veritists claim that true beliefs have final epistemic value 
and not epistemic final value. Thus, veritist consequentialists merely claim that true beliefs have final 
value in the epistemic domain. I will follow the common practice of taking this formulation to be 
indifferent with respect to the question whether true beliefs have this value only in virtue of being 
conducive to some other value outside the epistemic domain. 
5 It seems plausible to formulate the epistemic aim as improving the balance of interesting true beliefs 
over false ones. Otherwise, it would be epistemically appropriate to concentrate exclusively on beliefs 
that can be easily verified. Examples include beliefs concerning the number of grains of sand in our shoes 
and beliefs concerning the number of coffee beans in jars. By specifying the epistemic aim as being 
directed at interesting true beliefs, epistemic consequentialists can explain why this kind of behaviour 
would be epistemically inappropriate. Why I nonetheless put the term “interesting” in parentheses in the 
formulation of the ultimate epistemic aim in the main body of the text will be explained below (see. fn. 
8). 
6 Note the double character of this aim, it can be achieved either by increasing the number of (interesting) 
true beliefs or by decreasing the number of false ones. That the epistemic truth-aim has this kind of 
double character rests on insights by William James (cf. James 1897:18). 
7 These kinds of evaluations in the context of ethical consequentialism are variable with respect to two 
important parameters. First, both acts and other things can be morally evaluated: e.g. motives, maxims, 
institutions, and even beliefs. Second, acts and other things can be evaluated as being morally justified as 
6 
 
 
(EJ) Epistemic Justification of Belief. For all subjects S and propositions p: S’s 
belief that p is epistemically justified only if having the belief that p is conducive 
to the ultimate epistemic aim of improving the overall balance of (interesting)8 
true beliefs over false beliefs (to a certain degree).9 
 
Different versions of these positions can be characterized by further specifying what it 
means to be “conducive” to the respective aims.  
Let us first consider some important variations within ethical hedonistic 
consequentialism.10 Hedonistic consequentialists agree that, for an act A to be conducive 
to the specified aim, there must be some feature of A that will be accountable for a 
greater balance of pleasurable over painful experiences. However, different views take 
different features of A to be relevant. Act-consequentialists, for example, claim that the 
relevant feature is the causal chain of events set off by A. If this chain of events leads to 
a certain improvement of the balance of pleasure over pain, then the act is morally 
justified. Motive- or rule-consequentialists, on the other hand, think that the relevant 
feature is not the causal chain of events set off by A, but rather the motive-set M or the 
set of rules R according to which S performed A. If acting according to M (when 
possessed in appropriate circumstances) or according to R (when properly internalized 
by a sufficiently large group of the population) leads in the long run to a certain 
improvement in the balance of pleasure over pain, then the act in accordance with M or 
R is morally justified.  
                                                                                                                                          
well as being morally right, being morally required, being morally permitted, etc. For more variable 
parameters, see fn. 11. 
8 Even though the epistemic aim should be specified as being directed at interesting true beliefs, we 
should allow that uninteresting beliefs can be justified as well. Take the belief, for example, that there are 
321 grains of sand in my shoe. Let us suppose that holding this uninteresting belief cannot have any 
positive consequences with respect to increasing the number of interesting true beliefs. Nevertheless, we 
should allow that this belief could be justified. This is why I put the term “interesting” in parentheses in 
the formulation of (EJ). Even though the ultimate epistemic aim should be spelled out as being directed at 
increasing the number of interesting true beliefs, in our epistemic evaluation of beliefs sometimes the 
more general aim of increasing the number of true beliefs simpliciter seems relevant. 
9 Just as evaluations in the context of ethical consequentialism are variable, so are the evaluations in the 
context of epistemic consequentialism. First, not only beliefs but also other things can be epistemically 
evaluated: e.g. belief-sets, theories, belief-forming processes, and even acts. Second, beliefs or other 
things can not only be evaluated as being epistemically justified, they can also be evaluated as being 
epistemically rational, epistemically correct, epistemically required, epistemically permitted, etc. See also 
fn. 11. 
10 For a general overview of different versions of consequentialism in ethics, see Sinnot-Armstrong 2014. 
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It is important to note that, in the light of motive- or rule-consequentialism, act A 
is conducive to the specified aim in an indirect way. This is why these variants of 
consequentialism are sometimes subsumed under the term “indirect consequentialism”. 
In a certain sense, the act itself is not supposed to be conducive to the specified aim in 
order to be morally justified, but rather the motive set M or the rules R on which act A is 
based. This allows that, in individual cases, acting in accordance to M or R can even 
have negative effects with respect to the specified aim without thereby necessarily being 
unjustified. As long as acting in accordance to M or R will lead to a greater balance of 
pleasure over pain in the long run, an individual act can even have negative 
consequences with respect to the specified aim and still be morally justified. 
Besides identifying the feature of act A that is accountable for the act’s 
conduciveness towards the specified aim and thereby specifying in which way the act 
has to be conducive to the aim, hedonistic consequentialists have to decide whether the 
identified features of A have to improve the actual balance of pleasure over pain or 
whether it is enough that subject S reasonably believes that the ratio is improved. In 
other words: Are the features such that they improve the balance of pleasure over pain 
from a third- or a first-person perspective? Objective act-consequentialists hold that 
what is morally relevant is whether the actual chain of events set off by A leads to a 
greater balance of pleasure over pain. Subjective act-consequentialists, on the other 
hand, claim that what is morally relevant is not the actual chain of events, but rather the 
chain of events intended or expected by the agent. A similar distinction can be drawn 
within motive- or rule-consequentialism in ethics. Is it morally relevant whether acting 
according to motive-set M or rules R actually improves the balance of pleasure over 
pain in the long run, or is it relevant whether the subject intends or reasonably expects 
that this is the case? 
Even though there are more variable parameters within hedonistic 
consequentialism, the parameters introduced so far will suffice to spell out the analogies 
and disanalogies between ethical and epistemic consequentialist theories in which I am 
interested. So I will turn to epistemic variants of consequentialism. 11  
                                                
11 There are two more variable parameters within hedonistic consequentialism that should at least be 
mentioned. The first concerns the question of to what degree the balance of pleasure over pain has to be 
improved, i.e. is a satisficing or a maximizing version of hedonistic consequentialism preferred? Even 
though an analogous question could be raised in the epistemological realm, for the purposes of this paper 
this analogy is negligible. The second parameter concerns whether an egoistic or a non-egoistic form of 
hedonistic consequentialism should be preferred. In egoistic versions, only the ratio of the subject’s 
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Veritistic consequentialists in epistemology agree that, for a belief B to be 
conducive to the epistemic aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing 
the number of false ones, there must be some feature of B that will be accountable for a 
greater balance of true over false beliefs. However, as different ethical theories disagree 
with respect to the relevant features of act A, different versions of veritistic 
consequentialism in epistemology take different features of belief B to be relevant. 
Evidentialist versions of consequentialism, for example, think that the relevant feature is 
the body of evidence E on which B is based. If believing in accordance with E leads to a 
greater balance of true over false beliefs, then the belief appropriately based on E is 
justified.12 Conversely, process-reliabilists think that the relevant feature is not the body 
of evidence available to S, but rather the belief-forming process P that caused S to 
entertain the belief B (where this process does not have to include evidence). If P is 
sufficiently reliable––if it leads to true beliefs most of the time––then the belief based 
on P is epistemically justified.13  
Furthermore, veritistic consequentialists in epistemology not only disagree about 
the features accountable for a better ratio of true over false beliefs, they also disagree 
whether the identified features have to actually improve the balance in question or 
whether it is enough that the subject S thinks or believes that the balance is improved. In 
other words: Are the features such that they improve the balance of true over false 
beliefs from a third- or a first-person perspective or both? Pure objective epistemic 
consequentialists vote for the first option, pure subjective epistemic consequentialists 
vote for the second option, and mixed positions claim that the balance has to be 
improved both from a first- and third-person perspective.14 15 
                                                                                                                                          
pleasurable over painful experiences is relevant, whereas in non-egoistic versions the experiences of other 
people have to be taken into account. For obvious reasons, epistemic versions of consequentialism are 
more closely related to egoistic versions of ethical consequentialism than to non-egoistic versions. 
12 For views coming close to such a position, see Alston 1989; BonJour 1985, 2003; Conee 1992; 
Feldman 2000; Foley 1987, 1993. These philosophers agree that in order for a belief to be justified it has 
to be conducive to the epistemic truth-aim, where what is accountable for the conduciveness to the 
specified aim is the subject’s available body of evidence on which she is basing the belief. (Please note, 
however, that all these philosophers spell out the epistemic truth-aim slightly differently.) 
13 This very influential view has been suggested, developed, and defended by Alvin Goldman. He thinks 
that in order for a belief to be justified it has to be conducive to the epistemic truth-aim, where what is 
accountable for the conduciveness to the specified aim is the process leading to the belief (cf. Goldman 
1979, 1986, 2001). 
14 For a view coming close to a pure subjective position, see Lehrer 1974; a good example of a mixed 
position can be found in Alston 1989, 2005. 
15 In a certain usage of the terms “epistemic internalism” and “epistemic externalism”, the distinction 
between subjective and objective consequentialism amounts to the difference between epistemic 
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Please note that evidentialist and process-reliabilist versions of veritistic 
consequentialism can both be classified as forms of indirect consequentialism. In a 
certain sense, not the belief itself is supposed to be conducive to the epistemic aim in 
order to be justified but rather the body of evidence E or the belief-forming process P 
on which B is based.  
This is not an accident. Epistemic consequentialism tends to be spelled out as an 
instance of indirect consequentialism because it is pretheoretically plausible to assume 
that false beliefs can be epistemically justified. It seems plausible to suppose that, for 
example, in certain circumstances, my belief that my bike has been stolen is justified, 
without that belief’s being true. Perhaps, maybe unbeknownst to me, my neighbour 
borrowed the bike.16  
Subjective epistemic consequentialists can easily account for this possibility. 
However, if objective epistemic consequentialists want to allow that a false belief can 
be epistemically justified, then they have to claim that, in a certain sense, it is not the 
justified belief itself that has to be conducive to the specified epistemic aim but rather 
something else, such as the belief-forming process P or the body of evidence E on 
which B is based. This allows for the possibility that, in individual cases, a belief that is 
caused by a reliable process P or that is appropriately based on evidence E can be false 
and can thereby have negative effects with respect to the specified epistemic aim, 
without that belief’s thereby necessarily being unjustified. As long as believing in 
accordance to P or E will lead to a greater balance of true over false beliefs in the long 
run, the false belief in question can still be epistemically justified. It is interesting to 
note that, as indirect versions of consequentialism, epistemic consequentialist theories 
are more closely related to ethical motive- or rule-consequentialism than to ethical act-
consequentialism. 
Up to this point, the similarities between ethical and epistemic forms of 
consequentialism are pretty straightforward. Both have to specify due to which features 
and in what way a morally/epistemically justified act/belief is conducive to the 
respective aims. This decision will settle whether a direct or an indirect variant of 
                                                                                                                                          
internalism and epistemic externalism. However, because the latter terms are used differently in the 
literature it is better to stick to the terms “subjective epistemic consequentialism” and “objective 
epistemic consequentialism” with their stipulated meanings. 
16 Even though most epistemologists think that there can be justified false beliefs, not everyone agrees. 
For a defense of the opposite view that justification is factive, see Littlejohn 2012. 
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consequentialism is accepted. Consequentialists of both camps also have to specify 
whether the identified features are supposed to be conducive to the respective aims from 
a first- or third-person perspective or both. This decision will settle whether a subjective 
or an objective form of consequentialism (or a mixed position) is accepted.  
 
 
3. An important disanalogy between ethical an epistemic consequentialism 
 
There is a difference in the way we set things up between ethical and epistemic variants 
of consequentialism that catches one’s eye. The versions of epistemic consequentialism 
characterized above are all committed to the view that a belief is epistemically justified 
partially in virtue of factors speaking in favor of the truth of the justified belief itself, be 
it from a first- or a third-person perspective or both. Thus, the characterized positions 
are all committed to the following truth-indication principle (hereafter, (TI)): 
 
(TI) For all subjects S and propositions p: S’s belief that p is justified only if 
there are factors indicating that the belief itself is true.17 
 
The epistemic consequentialist positions characterized in section 2 claim that the 
justified belief is conducive to the global epistemic aim of improving the balance of true 
over false beliefs because there are some factors––either the body of available evidence 
E or the reliability of the belief-forming process P, etc.––that (to a certain extent) 
indicate––either from a first- or third-person perspective or both––that the belief itself is 
true. This is why holding justified beliefs will ultimately lead to a greater balance of 
true over false beliefs either from a first- or third-person perspective or both. Thus, in a 
certain sense, holding justified beliefs has positive epistemic consequences globally 
only because a justified belief has positive epistemic consequences locally. Holding 
justified beliefs has the positive global consequence that a greater balance of true over 
false beliefs is achieved in the long run. However, this positive global consequence is 
                                                
17 It is not easy to spell out in detail what it means to say that X partially in virtue of Y.  I assume it 
implies that whenever X is present, Y is present. Thus, it implies that X only if Y. This is why a position 
that claims that a belief is epistemically justified partially in virtue of factors indicating the truth of the 
justified belief itself is committed to (TI). 
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due to the positive local consequence that the justified belief itself is likely to be true––
again, either from a first-person perspective, a third person perspective or both. 18 19 
 In contrast, the characterized versions of hedonistic consequentialism are not 
committed to an analogous pleasure-indication principle. What would such a principle 
look like? If we simply substitute “epistemically justified” in (TI) by “morally justified” 
and any instance of “belief” by “act” and “truth/true” by “pleasure/pleasurable”, we 
yield the following pleasure-indication principle (PI): 
 
(PI) For all subjects S and acts A: S’s act A is morally justified only if there are 
some factors indicating that the act itself is pleasurable. 
 
In contrast to (TI), (PI) is quite implausible. First of all, in the way (PI) is formulated, it 
is not even intelligible because, although a belief itself can be true or false, an act itself 
cannot be pleasurable or painful. Only the experiences a subject has in performing an 
act can be pleasurable or painful. Thus, the pleasure-indication principle has to be 
formulated slightly differently: 
 
(PI)* For all subjects S and acts A: S’s act A is morally justified only if there are 
some factors indicating that S’s experiences in performing act A itself are 
pleasurable. 
 
In this form, the pleasure-indication principle is intelligible, but none of the versions of 
hedonistic consequentialism characterized in section 2 is committed to (PI)*. Hedonistic 
consequentialists do not subscribe to (PI)* because the principle seems clearly false. It 
is obviously not a necessary condition for an action to count as morally justified that the 
                                                
18 In a certain strand of Bayesian epistemology, known as epistemic utility theory, global and local 
epistemic aims are standardly differentiated (cf., e.g., Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010). I am suggesting that 
an analogous distinction should be drawn within a binary model of belief as well. The global aim 
concerns our whole belief-set and consists in improving the balance of true over false beliefs within this 
set. The local aim concerns individual beliefs and can roughly be characterized as: Believe that p if and 
only if p is true. The idea is that by subscribing to (TI), achievements with respect to the global aim are in 
a certain sense mediated by achievements with respect to the local aim. 
19 In the following quote, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins claims that mediating positive global consequences via 
positive local consequences should be considered a constraint for plausible versions of epistemic 
consequentialism: “The basic thought is roughly that we shouldn’t be able to establish that accepting S is 
epistemically rational just by establishing that such acceptance has optimal epistemic consequences 
overall, and without needing to make reference to particular epistemic goals we have with respect to S” 
(Jenkins 2007: 36).  
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agent experiences pleasure during the performance of this very action. Assume I am an 
incredibly penurious person, so that in donating money I literally experience pain. Is my 
action of donating money thereby condemned to be morally unjustified? Surely not. 
Thus, ethical consequentialists have very good reason to reject (PI)*.20  
 In contrast, incorporating (TI) into the epistemic consequentialist framework 
seems like an attractive move because, by subscribing to (TI), consequentialists can 
handle certain well-known and obvious counter-examples to crude versions of epistemic 
consequentialism. 
 
Grant-Seeking. Person X, a brilliant virologist and an agnostic, is seeking to 
obtain a research grant from a religious organization. If she receives the funding, 
she will be able to continue her research, which will eventually allow her to 
form a great many true beliefs and to revise many previously held false beliefs 
about matters of great importance. However, the funding organization will only 
give grants to persons who believe in the existence of God. Given these 
circumstances, should X form the belief that God exists? Would such a belief be 
epistemically justified (cf. Fumerton 2001: 55)?  
 
Prima facie, this case seems to be a counter-example to epistemic consequentialism. 
After all, X’s belief in the existence of God would clearly be conducive to the aim of 
improving the balance of interesting true beliefs over false ones. However, 
pretheoretically it is quite implausible to judge the belief in question as justified.  
By incorporating (TI) into the consequentialist framework, epistemic 
consequentialists can easily dismiss this case. Even though X’s belief concerning the 
existence of God is in a certain sense conducive to the epistemic aim, it is not conducive 
to that aim in the right kind of way, i.e. in the way specified by (TI). There are no 
factors indicating that the proposition in question is true––in the example, X neither has 
available evidence for the existence of God, nor would X’s belief forming method be 
                                                
20 One might think that (PI)* is only unattractive for someone rejecting egoistic versions of hedonistic 
consequentialism. However, that’s not true. As long as S’s act A will eventually lead to a greater balance 
of S’s pleasurable experiences over her painful experiences, even egoist versions of consequentialism will 
usually allow that A might very well be justified, even though performing A is accompanied by some pain 
for S. 
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particularly reliable. Thus, even though the belief is in a certain sense conducive to the 
epistemic aim, it is nevertheless epistemically unjustified.  
Counter-examples like these can be found in various places in the literature.21 
Before I localize the general lessons to be learned from these cases, let me introduce 
another very drastic one: 
 
Truth-Fairy. Suppose a truth-fairy exists who guarantees that, if I believe that 
Lake Constance is filled with milk––a proposition I have many good reasons to 
think is false and that is, in fact, false––then she will arrange things in a way that 
all the other (and logically independent) beliefs I entertain now and in the future 
will be true. Given these circumstances, should I believe that Lake Constance is 
filled with milk? Would that belief be epistemically justified (cf. Jenkins 2007: 
37)? 
 
Again, my belief that Lake Constance is filled with milk is clearly conducive to the 
epistemic aim. However, pretheoretically it is overwhelmingly plausible to think that 
this belief would be epistemically unjustified. By incorporating (TI) into the 
consequentialist framework, epistemic consequentialists can dismiss this case. My 
belief that Lake Constance is filled with milk is not truth-conducive in the right kind of 
way, i.e. in the way specified by (TI). 22 
                                                
21 For a list of references with similar uses of similar cases, see Berker 2013a: fn. 38. 
22 It should be noted that by incorporation of (TI) not all counter-examples to epistemic consequentialism 
can be dismissed. Two examples discussed by Berker still pose problems, namely the prime-number case 
(Berker 2013a: 375) and the John-Doe case (cf. Berker 2013b: 369; for a slightly modified version of the 
case, see p. 376). It could be argued that in both cases, beliefs are characterized that are not only 
conducive to the general epistemic goal; there are also certain factors indicating that the beliefs 
themselves are true. Nonetheless, in these cases we pretheoretically judge the beliefs in question as not 
being epistemically justified. Thus, consequentialists have to handle these cases differently. Simply 
incorporating (TI) into their framework will not allow resisting the pretheoretically implausible result 
with respect to these cases.  
However, I am unsure whether this poses an insurmountable problem for consequentialists. In  
the context of this paper I can only hint at ways in which consequentialists could react to these cases. 
First, a general remark: By incorporating (TI) into the consequentialist framework, most counter-
examples put forward in the literature can be dismissed, and the remaining counter-examples do not show 
that there is some deep structural problem with epistemic consequentialism. Rather, they show that some 
specific formulations of epistemic consequentialism are problematic.  
The prime-number case (Berker 2013a: 375; 2013b: 374-375), for example, only establishes a 
problem for reliabilist versions of consequentialism. And in the face of other well-known problems and 
counter-examples, reliabilists have to enhance and modify their accounts anyway. As far as I can see, 
some of these modifications will allow them to get to grips with the prime-number case as well. Berker 
himself mentions one such modification: The reliabilist theory could be modified such that what matters 
with respect to the justificatory status of a belief is not just whether it is formed by a reliable process, but 
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 There are two general lessons to be learned from considering these two counter-
examples. Epistemic consequentialists claim that the epistemic evaluation of a belief 
that p depends on positive consequences of entertaining that belief with respect to the 
specified epistemic end. However, plausible versions of epistemic consequentialism 
have to satisfy the following constraints. 
 
(a) The Means-End Constraint. The means-end relation of holding the justified 
belief that p and the specified epistemic aim of achieving a greater balance of 
true over false beliefs should be as close and direct as possible. It should not be 
remote (in the sense that it holds only due to many intermediary steps) or 
arbitrary.  
 
(b) The No-Trade-Off Constraint. Trade-offs between epistemic goods with respect 
to different propositions that involve guaranteed epistemic sacrifices (however 
small they might be) should not be allowed. It should not be allowed that one 
knowingly makes epistemic sacrifices with respect to a belief that p to achieve a 
greater epistemic good with respect to beliefs in other propositions.23  
 
The importance of the first constraint is vividly illustrated by the grant-seeking case and 
the importance of the second by the truth-fairy example. The latter illustrates that, even 
in drastic cases where we only have knowingly to trade in one insignificant and 
uninteresting false belief to guarantee the truth of all other beliefs we have––beliefs that 
                                                                                                                                          
also whether there is an alternative reliable belief-forming process available to the subject S that, had it 
been used, would have resulted in that belief’s not being held (cf., Berker 2013a: fn. 55). Berker quickly 
dismisses this strategy for the simple reason that we can just stipulate that in the prime-number case at 
hand such an alternative process is not available to S. However, I am not sure whether this can really be 
reasonably stipulated. It seems right to suppose that as soon as S entertains the beliefs that n is a prime 
number for various n and thereby grasps the concept PRIME NUMBER, an alternative belief-forming 
method than the one described by Berker in his example is available to S that, had it been used, would 
have resulted in S’s not believing that 7 is not a prime number.  
As for the John-Doe-case, it has the same kind of structure: A person holds the belief that p, 
where this belief has positive epistemic consequences and there are also some factors indicating that the  
belief itself is true. Nevertheless, in considering the John-Doe-case we pretheoretically judge that the 
belief in question is unjustified. However, Berker admits that the person’s belief is only obviously 
unjustified as long as we think that the person is not aware of the truth-indicative factors with respect to 
that belief. As soon as we suppose that she is aware of these factors, it is pretheoretically not so obvious 
anymore that the belief is unjustified. Thus, the case seems to rest on familiar internalistic intuitions. The 
case does not show that there is a general problem with the consequentialist framework, but rather that 
externalistic versions of such a framework are problematic. 
23 Berker 2013a argues that the most pressing problem of epistemic consequentialism is its countenance 
of this kind of trade-off.  
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might be very important and interesting to us––we pretheoretically do not countenance 
these kind of epistemic trade-offs.  
An epistemic consequentialist can easily meet these two constraints by 
incorporating (TI) in the consequentialist framework. First, incorporating (TI) ensures 
that the positive epistemic consequence of holding a justified belief with respect to the 
general epistemic aim is mediated by local positive epistemic consequences with respect 
to the justified belief itself. According to (TI), there have to be some factors that speak 
in favor of the truth of the justified belief either from a first- or a third-person 
perspective or both. The means-end relation between holding the belief and the 
epistemic aim of reaching a greater balance of true over false beliefs––either from a 
first- or a third-person perspective or both—is thereby not arbitrary and remote. Second, 
by incorporating (TI) into the epistemic consequentialist framework, the specified 
epistemic trade-offs are prevented.24 (TI) prevents an epistemically inferior belief from 
counting as epistemically justified just because many other epistemically excellent 
beliefs are gained by holding this epistemically inferior belief. Thus, recourse to 
constraints (a) and (b) helps explain why (TI) is quite plausible within the framework of 
epistemic consequentialism.  
We can also identify additional reasons based on this explanation, besides the 
one already given, as to why the analogue principle (PI)* in the ethical domain is 
implausible. Plausible versions of ethical consequentialism do not have to meet the 
ethical analogues to the epistemic constraints (a) and (b). First, it is implausible to think 
that the means-end relation between undertaking act A and the general aim of achieving 
a greater balance of pleasure over pain has to be spelled out so as to rule out many 
intermediary steps (cf., constraint (a)). My act of donating money is obviously not 
condemned to be morally unjustified just because this act leads to a greater balance of 
pleasure over pain only via many intermediary steps. Second, it is also implausible to 
suppose that every kind of trade-off in the ethical domain has to be prevented (cf. 
constraint (b)). On the contrary, it seems plausible to think that, in certain 
circumstances, painful experiences can be compensated for by many other pleasurable 
experiences. For example, if I could heal every suffering patient by pinching myself and 
my friend in the arm, this act of pinching could very well be morally justified. At least 
                                                
24 Other suggestions to prevent these trade-offs are discussed in Berker 2013b: 375-376 and Jenkins 
2007: 36–40. 
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in drastic scenarios like this, where the sacrifice with respect to the specified aim is very 
small (a little pain for my friend and me) and the benefits gained very high (no actual 
and future pain for anybody else), it seems overwhelmingly plausible that trade-offs 
should not be prevented.25 
So far we have seen that an important disanalogy between ethical and epistemic 
consequentialism lies in the fact that the latter position has to satisfy constraints (a) and 
(b), the former does not have to meet analogous constraints. We have also seen that 
epistemic consequentialists can meet these constraints by incorporating (TI) into their 
framework, whereas ethical consequentialists are well advised not to incorporate the 
analogous principle (PI)*. In the next section, I will consider the question of whether 
constraints (a) and (b) could also be met independent of (TI). Are epistemic 
consequentialists committed to (TI) or are there plausible versions of epistemic 
consequentialism that reject (TI), but nevertheless satisfy constraints (a) and (b)? If 
there were such a position, then the analogy between epistemic and ethical 
consequentialism would in a certain sense be stronger than one might think. It is true 
that, in contrast to ethical consequentialism, epistemic consequentialism has to satisfy 
constraints (a) and (b). However, if these constraints could be met independent of (TI), 
then just as hedonistic consequentialism in ethics is not committed to the pleasure-
indication principle (PI)*, so veritistic consequentialism in epistemology would not be 
committed to the truth-indication principle (TI). 
 
 
4. Epistemic consequentialism without the truth-indication principle 
 
With respect to many beliefs the truth-indication principle (TI) seems plausible. If, for 
example, my belief that it is raining right now is justified, then it seems plausible that 
this belief is justified through factors speaking in favor of its truth either from a first- or 
a third-person perspective or both. However, are there any exceptions to the principle? 
                                                
25 However, it is well known that countenancing trade-offs is also a source of serious problems of ethical 
consequentialism. After all, there are many cases where such trade-offs seem implausible (cf. Thomson 
1976). This leads to one of the most serious challenges for consequentialist theories in ethics, namely 
restricting the aggregative element in the theory, so as to allow for some trade-offs but not for others. It 
should be clear, however, that this restriction cannot be achieved by incorporating (PI)* into the theory, 
because by incorporating (PI)* all trade-offs would be prevented across the board.  
 
17 
 
Is (TI) as a general principle correct? 
 If one rejects (TI), then one allows that there are at least some beliefs that are 
non-truth-indicatively justified, i.e. beliefs that are justified independently of factors 
speaking in favor of their truth. If veritistic consequentialists want to allow for such 
beliefs (thereby allowing for exceptions to the general principle (TI)) then they have to 
give satisfying answers to the following questions:26  
 
(1) Which beliefs have a chance of being non-truth-indicatively justified? 
(2) In which sense are non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs epistemically justified, 
i.e. in which sense are they conducive to our epistemic aim of improving the 
balance of (interesting) true beliefs over false ones? 
(3) Is there a way to spell out the conduciveness of non-truth-indicatively justified 
beliefs towards the specified truth-aim that respects constraints (a) and (b)? 
 
I will try to answer these questions based on some some ideas put forward by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1969), Michael Williams (1996: 121–134; 2001: 146–172), and most 
explicitly Crispin Wright (2004). These philosophers agree that beliefs in certain 
propositions have a special epistemic status, namely beliefs in presuppositions of 
scientific inquiries or cognitive projects.27 I take this to be a promising starting point to 
answer questions (1)–(3) satisfactorily. Beliefs in presuppositions of cognitive projects 
are candidates of non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs. However, questions (2) and (3) 
especially can only be answered satisfactorily if it is specified what cognitive projects 
are and what kind of presuppositions they make.  
                                                
26 Note that non-veritistic epistemic consequentialists obviously have more resources to account for the 
existence of non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs than veritistic versions of consequentialism. 
27 Each of these philosophers can be interpreted as claiming that the special status of beliefs in 
presupposition of cognitive projects consists precisely in being candidates for beliefs that are justified 
independently of truth-indicative factors. However, in the context of this paper I will not defend this 
exegetical claim. It should be noted, though, that Wright’s theory of entitlements is most explicit with 
respect to this point, even though he does not use the term “presuppositon” for the propositions in 
question anymore (Wright 2014, fn. 3). Wright specifies entitlement as a form of epistemic warrant that is 
independent of truth-indicative factors (cf. Wright 2004; 2014). However, it is unclear according to 
Wright’s view whether the propositional attitude of belief is conceptually tied to truth-indicative factors, 
namely to reasons/evidence. Maybe it is conceptually impossible to believe p without having any kind of 
evidence (broadly construed) in favor of p. Therefore, Wright only claims that one can be entitled to 
accept or trust p where the propositional attitudes of acceptance and trust are supposed to be not as 
closely tied to evidence as the attitude of belief (cf. Wright 2004: 175–178). In what follows, I will ignore 
this complication. I will assume that it is possible to entertain the propositional attitude of belief, even 
though there are no truth-indicative factors that speak in favor of the truth of the belief. 
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 It is widely agreed that scientific inquiries and cognitive projects in general can 
be understood as attempts to formulate and answer questions (cf., Dewey 1938: 105; 
Hookway 1996: 7; Wright 2014: 215; etc.). If we accept that there is a close connection 
between cognitive projects and questions, then we might try to analyze the structure of 
cognitive projects by recourse to the semantics of questions. Perhaps the structure and 
presuppositions of a cognitive project can be clarified by analyzing the meaning of the 
question that in a certain sense constitutes the project. One approach to the semantics of 
questions is especially helpful in this respect, namely, a certain variant of the 
proposition-set theory. In subsection 4.1. I will introduce this theory. Fortunately for our 
purposes, introducing the basics of this theory will suffice. In subsection 4.2. I will then 
analyze the structure of cognitive projects via recourse to the introduced theory. Finally, 
in subsection 4.3 I will specify a version of consequentialism that allows for non-truth-
indicatively justified beliefs and answer questions (1)–(3) on the basis of the results in 
4.1. and 4.2.  
 
 
4.1 The proposition-set theory of questions  
 
Within truth-functional or possible-worlds semantics the meaning of a declarative 
sentence p is considered to be a function from possible worlds into the set of truth-
values {true, false}. Because these functions are equivalent to sets of possible worlds in 
which p is true, the meaning of a declarative sentence p (i.e. the proposition expressed 
by the sentence p) is simply considered to be the set of worlds in which p is true.  
Can this general idea be transferred to interrogative sentences?28 Obviously, an 
interrogative sentence ?p is neither true nor false. Thus, its meaning cannot be identified 
with the set of worlds in which it is true. The basic idea guiding the proposition-set 
approach to interrogatives is: understanding the meaning of an interrogative sentence ?p 
amounts to knowing what counts as a possible answer to it. Thus, the meaning of ?p 
cannot be identified with a set of worlds in which ?p is true but with a set of possible 
answers to ?p or, more precisely, with the set of meanings of possible and congruent 
answers. Because answers are taken to be the meanings of declarative sentences, the 
                                                
28 In what follows I will concentrate on direct questions and will not consider issues concerning 
embedded interrogatives. 
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meaning of a question amounts to a set of propositions, i.e. a set of sets of worlds (cf., 
Hamblin 1958, 1973; Karttunen 1977; Gronendijk & Stokhof 1982, 1984, 1997).29  
Take a look at the following interrogative sentence: “Who left the party?” For 
simplicity’s sake, let us suppose that there is no possible world with more than two 
people, Maria and Joseph. Proposition-set theorists specify the meaning of “Who left 
the party?” as the set of congruent answer-propositions, i.e. the set of propositions 
expressed by the sentences: “Maria left the party”, “Joseph left the party”, “Maria and 
Joseph left the party”, and “Nobody left the party”. 30  
Note that the proposition expressed by the sentence “Maria left the party” does 
not exclude that Joseph left as well. However, the answer “Maria left the party” is in a 
certain sense incomplete if Joseph also left and the speaker knows that. This observation 
can be incorporated into the semantic framework by following Gronendijk and 
Stokhof’s suggestion that answer-propositions form a mutually exclusive and complete 
partition of possible worlds (cf. Gronendijk & Stokhof 1984; 1997).31 In such a system 
the meaning of “Who left the party?” divides a certain subspace of the space of possible 
worlds into non-overlapping cells that correspond to the propositions that only Maria 
left, that only Joseph left, that Maria and Joseph left, and that nobody left.  
A complete answer to the question, “Who left the party?” corresponds to one cell 
of this partition and thereby excludes all the other cells. An incomplete or partial 
answer, however, does not exclude all cells except for one, but it does exclude at least 
one cell. In this sense, “Either Maria or Joseph left the party” constitutes a partial 
answer insofar as it excludes that nobody left. Besides complete and partial answers, we 
can also specify over-informative answers, answers that are not complete though they 
imply a complete answer. Thus, the sentence, “Joseph left the party without his shoes” 
constitutes an over-informative answer.  
                                                
29 Please note that these authors spell out the specified general idea very differently.  
30 An answer is not congruent if its meaning is not an element of the meaning of ?p. Take a look at our 
example: “Who left the party?” First, there are many sentences that would not even count as possible 
answers: e.g. “Berlin is the capital of Germany”, “It’s raining”. To react to the question by uttering these 
sentences would be completely off the mark or would introduce some kind of implicature. Thus, the 
meanings of these sentences are obviously not elements of the meaning of the question. Second, there are 
other sentences that might constitute acceptable reactions to the question but still cannot be considered 
answers: e.g. “I do not know”; “I won’t tell you”. Thus, the meanings of these sentences are also not an 
element of the meaning of the question. Third, there are some sentences that can be considered answers, 
but not congruent answers: e.g. “Joseph left without his shoes”; “Either Joseph or Maria left”. The first 
sentence constitutes an over-informative and the second an under-informative or incomplete answer to the 
question. I will come back to over-informative and incomplete answers in the main body of the text.  
31 In his seminal paper on questions, Hamblin already suggested this option (cf., Hamblin 1958). 
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Within such a framework, two kinds of presuppositions of questions can be 
differentiated, namely semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. By “semantic 
presupposition of a question” I mean a proposition that is implied by every complete 
answer-proposition (cf. Higginbotham 1996: 375). In our example, the proposition that 
there is a party taking place is a semantic presupposition of the question, “Who left the 
party?” Every complete answer-proposition implies that there is a party taking place. 
Thus, all worlds in which no party is taking place are excluded. This can be illustrated 
by the following figure (Fig.1). (Please note that square brackets are used to refer to the 
proposition that is expressed by the sentence inside the brackets.) 
 
 
Fig. 1 
 
The big rectangle that incorporates compartments A–E (each of which represents a set 
of worlds) symbolizes the space of all logically possible worlds. In a certain sense, the 
meaning of the question, “Who left the party?” divides this space into an answer-space 
and a presupposition-space. The answer-space is the exhaustive set of answer-
propositions. It is divided into non-overlapping cells B–E, which together fill the whole 
answer-space. The presupposition space A includes all worlds that are excluded by the 
semantic presuppositions of the question, i.e. it includes all worlds in which no party is 
taking place. In more general terms, the presupposition-space can be characterized as 
the union of all propositions incompatible with the semantic presuppositions of the 
question.  
 Besides semantic presuppositions, we also need to introduce pragmatic 
presuppositions. Note that in some situations the sentence, “Maria’s husband left the 
party”, is just as good an answer as, “Joseph left the party”. However, the propositions 
(the sets of worlds) that correspond to these two sentences are not identical. After all, 
there are some possible worlds in which Maria and Joseph are not married. Even though 
“Maria’s husband left the party“ and “Joseph left the party” are not equivalent, in the 
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sense that these sentences do not express the same proposition, the sentences can 
nevertheless in certain circumstances constitute equally good answers to the given 
question. How is that possible? 
 Building on insights by Robert Stalnaker (1970, 1973), this can be explained by 
recourse to beliefs taken for granted by the participants of the conversation. Assume 
that all participants of a conversation take for granted that Maria and Joseph are 
married. Thus, all possible worlds in which they are not married are excluded in the 
sense that they are not an element of the sets of possible worlds that represent the 
doxastic sets of the participants. In this case the conversational impact of the answers, 
“Joseph left the party”, and, “Maria’s husband left the party”, will be identical. This can 
be illustrated by the following figure (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
The circle in the middle symbolizes the set of worlds in which Maria and Joseph are 
married, and thereby it symbolizes a belief taken for granted by the participants––i.e. all 
worlds in which they are not married (all worlds outside the circle) are excluded. Fig. 2 
represents that the set of worlds in which Maria and Joseph are married contains 
elements of the sets A, B, C, D, and E. In some worlds in which Maria and Joseph are 
married, no party is taking place; in others a party is taking place and both left the party; 
still in others, nobody left, etc. If the participants of the conversation take for granted 
that Maria and Joseph are married, then the answers, “Joseph left the party”, and, 
“Maria’s husband left the party”, will both correspond to the same set of worlds, 
namely, the set of worlds represented in Fig. 2 by the grey-tinted compartment 
representing the intersection of the propositions [Only Joseph left the party] and [Maria 
and Joseph are married]. Thus, by introducing pragmatic presuppositions and 
characterizing them as the set of beliefs taken for granted by the participants it can be 
explained why the answers, “Joseph left the party”, and, “Maria’s husband left the 
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party”, can in certain circumstances constitute equally complete and satisfying answers. 
 Gronendijk and Stokhof, therefore, relativize the meaning of questions on the set 
of beliefs taken for granted by the participants of a conversation (Gronendijk & 
Stokhoff 1984: 147–148). Let us call the union of the sets of possible worlds 
corresponding to the beliefs all participants take for granted the “context set”. The 
meaning of an interrogative sentence ?p can then be specified as the partition of the 
context set into an exhaustive set of answer-propositions on the one hand and the union 
of all propositions incompatible with the semantic presuppositions of ?p on the other. 
 This characterization of questions and their semantic and pragmatic 
presuppositions will help us to specify the structure and presuppositions of cognitive 
projects, which in turn will allow us to spell out the idea that beliefs regarding the 
presuppositions of cognitive projects are promising candidates of non-truth-indicatively 
justified beliefs. 
 
 
4.2. The characterization of cognitive projects  
 
Based on the proposition-set theory, we can spell out the idea that cognitive projects are 
closely related to questions in more detail.  
What is a cognitive project? A cognitive project is an attempt to formulate and 
answer a question. The meaning of a question in the context of a cognitive project can 
be understood as a partition of the set of possible worlds along the lines of the 
proposition-set theory.32 The meaning of the question gives the cognitive project its 
direction and goal. The goal of a cognitive project consists in identifying the complete 
and true answer to the question, thereby excluding all other possible answers.33 34 
                                                
32 Please note that this does not presuppose that the proposition-set theory is correct as a semantic theory 
of interrogative sentences. Even if one thinks that the proposition-set theory is unconvincing as a 
semantic theory of everyday interrogative sentences, the theory could nevertheless be used as a tool to 
analyze the questions in the background of cognitive projects.  
33 This specification of the goal of a cognitive project is given from a veritistic perspective. After all, the 
given characterization of cognitive projects is supposed to lead to an interesting version of veritistic 
epistemic consequentialism that is not committed to (TI). All philosophers claiming that truth (or more 
precisely improving the balance of true over false beliefs) is not the only and not even the most important 
epistemic value will probably dismiss this specification of the goal of cognitive projects. 
34 Note that two cognitive projects described by interrogative sentences with the same wording might still 
be very different projects. This is because two interrogative sentences with the same wording can have a 
very different meaning, i.e. they can partition the set of possible worlds very differently. 
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What does it mean to make progress within a cognitive project? One has made 
progress in a cognitive project if one (or more) of the following conditions are met: (i) 
the set of possible answers is identified (or at least some possible answers are 
identified); (ii) a true but incomplete answer is identified, i.e. at least one possible 
answer is excluded; or (iii) the true and complete answer is identified, i.e. all other 
possible answers are excluded. 
Meeting condition (i) in a certain sense constitutes minimal progress within a 
project because by meeting (i) only the meaning of the question (i.e. the set of possible 
congruent answers) that constitutes the project in the first place is clarified. Meeting 
condition (iii) constitutes maximal progress within a cognitive project because by 
meeting (iii) the project is successfully concluded.  
The given characterization of a cognitive project makes it reasonable to regard 
such a project as a systematic attempt to achieve the epistemic aim of improving the 
balance of interesting true beliefs over false ones. Particularly in light of the double 
character of this aim, performing a cognitive project seems to be one of the most 
attractive means available to achieve this aim. In light of the double character of the 
epistemic goal, we are supposed to strive for increasing the number of interesting true 
beliefs (beliefs in the truth of which we are interested), but we have to strive for them in 
a way that simultaneously avoids false beliefs. This is exactly what we do during the 
performance of a cognitive project. First, we ask for something of interest to us. Second, 
we try to clarify the meaning of the question by clarifying what would count as a 
possible answer to it. Third, we systematically check each possible answer and dismiss 
it if it is false. In the best case, we will conclude such a project by having identified the 
one and only true and complete answer to the question we are interested in.  
What are presuppositions of a cognitive project? The presuppositions of a 
cognitive project are the semantic and pragmatic presuppositions of the question 
constituting the project. Semantic presuppositions are the propositions implied by all 
complete answers to the question constituting the project. Pragmatic presuppositions are 
the beliefs taken for granted by all people engaged in the project, or more precisely: the 
propositions the truth of which is taken for granted by the participants of a project. 
The latter presuppositions have two important functions. First, remember that 
the meaning of a question is specified as the partition of the context set. Thus, the 
propositions the truth of which is taken for granted by the participants of a cognitive 
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project in part determine the meaning of the question that defines the structure and 
direction of the project. Second, pragmatic presuppositions of a cognitive project will 
specify in which circumstances a possible answer qualifies as being excluded. It will 
thereby in part determine in what circumstances progress within a project is achieved. 
Suppose Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson are engaged in a cognitive project specified 
by the question, “Who committed the murder?” They systematically check the possibly 
correct answers: “the gardener committed the murder”, “the chauffeur committed the 
murder”, etc. Let us suppose that both believe that, if a person has been a thousand 
miles away from the crime scene at the time of the murder, then that person did not 
commit the murder. The content of this conditional belief is part of the context set i.e. it 
is a pragmatic presupposition of the question that defines the project. It is obvious that 
this pragmatic presupposition will determine under which circumstances Holmes and 
Watson are in a position to exclude a possible answer, thereby making progress in their 
project. 
 When is a cognitive project hopeless or irrational? If the presuppositions of a 
cognitive project imply that no progress within a project can be made or if the 
presuppositions are contradictory, then the cognitive project is hopeless or irrational.  
 
 
4.3. Cognitive projects and non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs 
 
Based on the characterization of cognitive projects given in subsection 4.2, we can spell 
out a version of veritistic epistemic consequentialism that allows for non-truth-
indicatively justified beliefs and is therefore not committed to (TI) in its general form. 
At the beginning of section 4, we saw that veritistic consequentialists who want to allow 
for non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs have to give satisfying answers to questions 
(1)–(3). 
Question (1): Which beliefs have a chance of being non-truth-indicatively 
justified? The beliefs in presuppositions of cognitive projects that are neither hopeless 
nor irrational are candidates for being non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs; i.e. a 
belief in presuppositions of such a project has a chance of being justified independently 
from truth-indicative factors speaking in favor of the truth of the belief itself. (Thus, 
these beliefs constitute possible exceptions to (TI)). Please note that the candidates for 
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non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs are restricted to beliefs in presuppositions of 
projects that are neither hopeless nor irrational; the presuppositions of any old 
cognitive project will not do. Note also that beliefs in presuppositions of such projects 
are only candidates of non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs. Actually to count as non-
truth-indicatively justified, these beliefs have to satisfy further conditions, as explained 
below. 
Question (2): In which sense are non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs 
epistemically justified, i.e. in which sense are they conducive to our epistemic aim of 
improving the balance of (interesting) true beliefs over false ones? The given 
characterization of cognitive projects has revealed that a cognitive project can be 
considered a systematic quest to achieve the epistemic goal of increasing the number of 
intersting true beliefs while at the same time avoiding false ones. In fact, engaging in 
cognitive projects seems to be one of the best means available to achieve this goal. 
Because beliefs in the presuppositions of cognitive projects are necessary to perform the 
projects––as the presuppositions constitute the structure and direction of these projects 
in the first place––and performing these projects in turn seem to be one of the best 
systematic means available to achieve the specified epistemic goal, beliefs in the 
presuppositions of cognitive projects are conducive to our epistemic goal. 35  
However, please note that this is only true from a first-person perspective. It is 
not guaranteed that performing a cognitive project, which was made possible by holding 
certain presuppositions to be true, actually leads to a greater balance of interesting true 
beliefs over false ones. However, subjects engaged in such projects expect and intend 
that this is the case. Indeed, one of the main reasons subjects are engaged in cognitive 
projects is that by performing these projects they intend to dismiss false answers and 
eventually find the complete true answer to a question in which they are interested. 
Thus, the envisaged veritistic consequentialist position that does not subscribe to the 
truth-indicative principle (TI) is a variant of subjective consequentialism insofar as not 
the actual consequences of holding a non-truth-indicatively justified belief, but rather 
the consequences intended and expected by the subject are relevant. 
Question (3): Is there a way to spell out the conduciveness of non-truth-
                                                
35 This answer can also be considered an answer to an important challenge raised with respect to 
Wright’s theory of entitlement, namely the challenge to specify in which sense “entitlement” is is an 
epistemic notion rather than a purely pragmatic one (cf. Pritchard 2007: 207; Jenkins 2007: 27).  Wright’s 
own answer to this challenge proceeds broadly along similar lines (cf. Wright 2014: 238-239). 
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indicatively justified beliefs towards the specified epistemic goal that respects 
constraints (a) and (b)? The conduciveness of non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs 
towards the epistemic goal is spelled out in a way that meets the means-end relation (see 
constraint (a)). Believing the presuppositions of a cognitive project is a necessary means 
to perform such a cognitive project, and performing such a project, in turn, seems to be 
one of the best means available to achieve the specified epistemic goal. Thus, the 
means-end relation between holding a non-truth-indicatively justified belief in the 
presuppositions of cognitive projects and the specified epistemic aim is neither arbitrary 
nor remote. 
What about the no-trade-off constraint (see constraint (b))? This constraint 
demands that it should not be allowed that we knowingly make epistemic sacrifices 
with respect to a belief in p to achieve a greater epistemic good with respect to beliefs in 
other propositions. The truth-fairy example vividly illustrates the importance of this 
constraint. By subscribing to (TI), epistemic consequentialists can ensure that this 
constraint is met. However, it is unclear whether the envisaged consequentialist position 
that rejects (TI) and allows that beliefs in presupposition of cognitive projects are non-
truth-indicatively justified satisfies the constraint as well. The easiest way to make sure 
that the envisaged position satisfies constraint (b) consists in adding further conditions 
for non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs. Thus, the envisaged account should be 
modified and extended along the following lines: 
 
S’s belief that p is non-truth-indicatively justified if and only if 
(I) p is a presupposition of one of S’s cognitive projects that is neither 
hopeless nor irrational;  
(II) the body of evidence E available to S does not make it likely that not-p;  
 
!  
 
Condition (I) ensures that non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs are conducive to the 
epistemic aim in a way that satisfies the means-ends relation (a). Condition (II) ensures 
that the no-trade-off constraint (b) is met as well. Condition (II) ensures that one cannot 
gain a non-truth-indicatively justified belief by knowingly making epistemic sacrifices 
with respect to a belief in a certain proposition to achieve a greater epistemic good with 
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respect to beliefs in other propositions. Thus, even though the proposed variant of 
veritistic epistemic consequentialism is not committed to (TI), it nevertheless satisfies 
constraints (a) and (b).  
The dots in the definition indicate that the account could easily be extended by 
further conditions (III), (IV), etc. Conditions (I) and (II) already seem to suffice to 
circumvent all counter-examples against epistemic consequentialism put forward in the 
literature. However, conditions (I) and (II) by themselves still seem too permissive, 
insofar as they probably make it too easy to have a non-truth-indicatively justified 
belief. In order to respond to this problem, it might become necessary to extend the 
definition by further conditions.36 37 
 As far as the definition in its current form goes, a promising example of a non-
truth-indicatively justified belief is the belief that my senses work reliably. The 
proposition that my senses are working reliably is unquestionably a presupposition of 
many of my cognitive projects that are neither hopeless nor irrational, and the body of 
evidence available to me does not make it likely that this proposition is false.38  
In summary, the specified version of epistemic consequentialism has the 
following features. First, it is veritistic insofar as it claims that beliefs can be 
epistemically evaluated by recourse to the specified truth-goal. More precisely, it holds 
that, if a belief is epistemically justified, then holding the belief is conducive to the aim 
of increasing the number of interesting true beliefs and simultaneously avoiding false 
beliefs. Second, the position is non-truth-indicative insofar as it allows that at least 
some beliefs are justified independently of truth-indicative factors’ speaking in favor of 
the truth of the beliefs themselves. Third, the position is subjective insofar as––at least 
with respect to non-truth-indicatively justified beliefs––not the actual consequences of 
holding the belief are epistemically relevant, but rather the consequences the subject 
                                                
36 Of course, the definition of “non-truth-indicative justification” cannot be extended by conditions 
demanding truth-indicative factors (i.e. evidence for the belief or the reliability of the belief-forming 
process). Otherwise, it would not be a definition of non-truth-indicative justification.  
37 Building on Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlement, we could, for example, add the following 
condition: (III) any attempt to justify p by evidence would be epistemically circular insofar as it would 
involve something of no more secure standing than p itself (cf. Wright 2004: 191–192). 
38 Please note that, even if we add condition (III) to the definition of non-truth-indicative justification 
(see fn.36), the belief that my senses work reliably would still seem like a promising example of a non-
truth-indicatively justified belief. It seems plausible that my belief that my senses work reliably cannot be 
justified a priori. However, any attempt to justify the belief by empirical evidence seems to be 
epistemically circular insofar as it would presuppose that my senses work reliably. Therefore, the belief in 
question seems to satisfy condition (III) as well.  
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intends or reasonably expects.39 Engaging in a cognitive project does not guarentee that 
the balance of true over false beliefs is improved. However, epistemic agents expect that 
this is the case, the only reason why they engage in these kind of projects is because 
they intend to make headway with respect to the aim of increasing the number of 
interesting true beliefs while at the same time avoiding false ones. Fourth, even though 
the position rejects (TI) as a general principle, it nevertheless satisfies the means-end 
constraint (see constraint (a)) and the no-trade-off constraint (see constraint (b)). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of the discussion can be summarized as follows: Veritistic epistemic conse-
quentialism is structurally analogous to hedonistic consequentialism in ethics. Both 
variants of consequentialism explicate normative notions via recours to final values and 
ultimate goals in their respective domains. Furthermore, consequentialism in both 
domains can be spelled out in a direct or indirect and a subjective or objective version 
(see. Sect. 2).  
Besides these similarities, there are also important dissimilarities. One difference 
consists in the fact that the former has to meet the means-end constraint (see constraint 
(a)) and the no-trade-off constraint (see constraint (b)), whereas the latter does not have 
to satisfy analogous constraints in the ethical domain. Epistemic consequentialists can 
ensure that their theory meets the specified constraints by incorporating the truth-
indication principle (TI) into their consequentialist framework, i.e., by claiming that a 
belief is epistemically justified only if there are factors indicating the truth of the belief 
itself. This is why popular versions of epistemic consequentialism subscribe to (TI), 
whereas popular versions of ethical consequentialism do not subscribe to an analogous 
pleasure-indication principle (PI)* (see Sect. 3).  
However, building on ideas suggested by Wittgenstein, Williams, and most 
explicitly by Wright, a version of veritistic epistemic consequentialism can be defended 
that rejects (TI) as a general principle, but is nevertheless able to satisfy constraints (a) 
and (b). The basic thought is roughly that beliefs in presuppositions of cognitive 
                                                
39 Whether the same is true for truth-indicatively justified beliefs as well is left open by the suggested 
version of non-truth-indicative epistemic consequentialism.  
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projects can be justified independently of factors speaking in favor of their truth. 
Nonetheless, these beliefs can be epistemically justified in the sense that they are 
conducive to our epistemic aim of improving the overall balance of (interesting) true 
beliefs over false ones––at least from a first-person perspective. Combining the idea that 
a cognitive project is an attempt to answer a question with the proposition-set theory 
allows one to specify this basic thought in more detail. Furthermore, this combination 
delivers the resources to spell out the conduciveness of non-truth-indicatively justified 
beliefs regarding the specified epistemic aim in a way that respects constraints (a) and 
(b) (see Sect. 4). 
Thus, even though the truth-indication principle (TI) seems plausible for many 
beliefs, veritistic consequentialists can allow for exceptions to the principle without 
thereby violating contstraints (a) and (b). Hence, just as hedonistic consequentialism in 
ethics is not committed to the pleasure-indication principle (PI)*, so veritistic 
consequentialism in epistemology is not committed to the truth-indication principle 
(TI).40 
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